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RECENT DECISIONS
cation. The Act of 1891, however, required deposit "not later than
the date of first publication." The Bill Committee of the 1909 Act
thought this requirement too hard for the reason that "the delay of a
single day" after publication in making the deposit "might destroy a
copyright" and so the committee recommended an extension of time
for deposit.' 8 Thus the question: what did Congress have in mind
when it continued in the 1909 revision of the copyright laws the
requirement for the deposit of copies arises. A glance at the source
of the expression and the judicial construction of it prior to the 1909
Act will give perspective 19 to the instant Act. Prior to the 1909 Act
the United States Supreme Court construed provisions for deposit as
essential requirements to the perfection of copyright, whether consid-
ered as conditions precedent or subsequent. The committee reporting
the 1909 Act pointed out that "under existing law (the 1891 Act
being then in force) the filing of title and deposit of copies on or before
the date of first publication are 'conditions precedent' and any failure
to comply with them works a forfeiture of the copyright. It is pro-
posed under this bill to so change this as to have the copyright effective
upon the publication with notice and the other formalities become
'conditions subsequent'." 20
Petitioners asserted monopoly rights rest solely on the letter
and intent of the statute.21  The Act requires "prompt deposit." Ad-
mittedly, petitioner delayed fourteen months after publication before
making deposit.
Did Congress intend that the requirement as to deposits must be
literally complied with in order to perfect the copyright interest under
the 1909 Act? The majority opinion, in effect, does not make such
a compliance necessary but history, apparently, is on the side of the
dissenters.22
A. J. S.
CRIMINAL LAw-DIsORDERLY PERSON-SECTION 899(5) CON-
STRUED.-The defendant was accused under Section 899(5) of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure which provides: "Persons
Is Instead of requiring deposit within a fixed number of days, or by the
date of publication, the bill as reported, and the 1909 Act as passed, permitted
a copyright to be perfected by a "prompt deposit" after publication. The com-
mittee did not recommend, nor did Congress provide, that Copyright could be
perfected without deposit; the committee did recommend an extension of the
time for deposit.
19 Kepnor v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797 (1904).
20 H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
21 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 24 Sup. Ct. 797 (1888) ; Caliga v.
Inter Ocean Newspaper, 215 U. S. 182, 30 Sup. Ct. 38 (1909) ; Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 346, 28 Sup. Ct. 722 (1908) ; Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Walker, 210 U. S. 356, 367, 28 Sup. Ct. 726 (1909).
22 See dissenting opinion of Justice Black in instant case.
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who have no visible profession or calling by which to maintain them-
selves, but who do so for the most part, by gaming" 1 are disorderly
persons.2 Defendant, interpreting the statute as meaning that only
those whose actual physical support is dependent upon the revenue
received from gaming are guilty, did not attempt to establish a "visible
profession or calling" other than his gaming activities,3 but proceeded
to show that since he had ample financial resources, 4 exclusive of his
gaming income whereby his support was assured, he did not, "for the
most part", maintain himself by gaming. Held, defendant guilty.5
The legislative intent "was the suppression of excessive gaming".
People of State of New York v. Erickson, 171 Misc. 937, 13 N. Y.
S. (2d) 997 (1939).
Clearly, the section is not, in itself, entirely free from ambiguity,
and it must be admitted that defendant's interpretation does find
support in the statute under the clause "by which to maintain them-
selves". Bearing in mind the meaning of the word "maintain", 1
defendant's proof that he was amply able to support himself and is not
dependent for his support "for thd most part" on his gaming income,
would at first glance seem to constitute a good defense. Although
penal statutes, as a fundamental rule, must be strictly construed,7 the
1 Gaming is "a contract between two or more persons by which they agree
to play by certain rules at cards, dice, or other contrivance, and that one shall
be the loser and the other the winner." BouvimR, LAW DICTIONARY (Stud. ed.
1928) 460.
"Gaming" and "gambling" are treated as synonymous. Clement v. Belanger,
120 App. Div. 662, 105 N. Y. Supp. 537 (3d Dept. 1907).
2 It is important to note that defendants found violating the above section
are not guilty of a crime. People v. Fuerst, 13 Misc. 304, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1115
(1895) ("After careful examination'of the books we fail to find that a 'dis-
orderly person' as defined by § 899 of the CODE OF CRIM. PRoC., is, in contempla-
tion of law, guilty of the commission of either a misdemeanor or a felony") ;
People ex rel. Van Houton v. Sadler, 97 N. Y. 146 (1884) ("The main purpose
of those provisions (CODE CRIM. PROC. § 899) is to arrest the disorderly prac-
tices named, by compelling a disorderly person to give security for his good
behavior"); People v. Dimitry, 163 Misc. 279, 297 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (1937)
(The offense of being a "disorderly person" is the one proceeded against before
a magistrate without a jury, is sui generis, and is neither a misdemeanor nor a
felony).
3Defendant not only admitted that he received many bets directly on
various sporting events (horse racing, world series, fights, football, etc.) but
that he operated extengively through agents. Instant case at 938.
SThe unrefuted testimony of an accountant called on the behalf of the
defendant showed tliat he was worth at least $317,000. Instant case at 940.
5 Pursuant to N. Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 901(2), which provides the punish-
ment for disorderly persons, the court required that defendant give security in
the sum of $10,000 to the effect that defendant will be of good behavior for the
space of one year. Instant case at 945.
6 "Maintain" means to support; to supply with means of support; provide
for; sustain; keep up." State v. Board of Trust of Vanderbilt University, 129
Tenn. 279, 164 S. W. 1151 (1914).
7 Statute is criminal in nature and is to be strictly construed. People v.
Neyer, 79 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1902); People ex tel. Commissions of Public
Charities and Correction v. Cullen, 159 N. Y. 629, 47 N. E. 894 (1897) ; People
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legislative intent, when clearly established, becomes a substantial part
of the statute as though expressly inserted therein.8 Therefore, a
clear determination of the legislative intent becomes necessary.
At early common law no game in itself was unlawful, 9 and the
winner might even maintain a special action to recover the stake won.' 0
The tendency, however, was to render such gaming illegal as a public
nuisance when they tended to breach the peace," led to immorality-,12
or were conducted by means of cheating or fraud, 13 or were in any
wise against public policy.14 In England as early as 1664, a statute 15
was passed condemning excessive gaming. In substance it provided
that "all lawful games and exercises should not be otherwise used
than as innocent and moderate recreations, and not as constant trades
or callings to gain a living or make unlawful advantage thereby", the
express purpose of the statute being the suppression of excessive
gaming because of the ill consequences. Even modem statutes con-
demn excessive gaming which will tend to affect the public at large.' 6
However, ordinary betting, where the amount is reasonable,17 has
never been made a crime in New York.'8 Indeed, the Court of Ap-
peals has held that "Casual betting or gaming by individuals, as dis-
tinguished from betting or gambling as a business or profession is not
a crime".' 9 The law does not prohibit individuals from acting as they
desire in their affairs, unless by so doing they become objectionable to
the best interests of society. Keeping these considerations in mind,
can one whose entire business day is ,spent in gaming activities seek
immunity from the law on the ground that he is wealthy? The law
was not intended to exempt a wealthy gambler. The court in the
instant case held, "The words 'by which to maintain themselves' as
v. Schenkel, 140 Misc. 843, 252 N. Y. Supp. 415 (1931), aff'd, 258 N. Y. 224,
179 N. E. 474 (1932).
8 The mischief designed to be remedied may be considered by the courts in
the interpretation of a statute. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 193 N. Y. 409, 86 N. E.
468 (1908) ; see Note (1931) 70 A. L. R_ 5.
D Sherbon v. Colebach, Z Vent. 175 (1726) ; Thomson v. Hayes, 59 Misc.
425, 111 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1908).
10 State v. Vaughn, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S. W. 685 (1906) ; People v. Langan,
196 N. Y. 260, 89 N. E. 921 (1909).
2" Mullen v. Mosely, 13 Idaho 457, 90 Pac. 986 (1907).
12 See Note (1910) 33 Am. DEc. 134.
13 Ibid.
14 Zeltner v. Irwin, 25 App. Div. 228, 49 N. Y. Supp. 337 (lst Dept. 1898).
'5 16 CAi. II, c. 7.
'6 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 970, 973, 986, 988, 990, 991; N. Y. COE CRIM.
PROC. § 899(5) ; N. Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9.
17 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 990 punishes by fine of five times the value of sum
lost or won if sum exceeds $25.00.
Is People v. McLaughlin, 128 App. Div. 599, 113 N. Y. Supp. (lst Dept.
1908); People v. Stedeker, 175 N. Y. 57, 67 N. E. 132 (1903); People v.
Bright, 203 N. Y. 73, 96 N. E. 362 (1911).
"9 Watts v. Malatesta, 262 N. Y. 80, 186 1t. E. 210 (1933) ; see People v.
Bright, 203 N. Y. 73, 96 N. E. 362 (1911).
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employed in the statute when considered in the light of its enactment 20
has nothing to do with financial return, but refers to constant uninter-
rupted and excessive gaming indulged in during the waking hours
normally spent by those intent on maintaining themselves in some
peaceable or legitimate vocation, no matter how humble it be." 21 This
interpretation gives us a statute which can effectively suppress the
activities of the undesirable individual whose day is spent in gaming
activity. B.L.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-RESTRAINING ACTION BY CITIZEN OF
NEW YORK AGAINST ANOTHER CITIZEN OF NEW YORK IN A FOR-
EIGN JURISDICTION.-Plaintiff, who owned and controlled certain mo-
tion picture theatres located in England, contracted to sell them
through defendant, as agent. Both plaintiff and defendant were resi-
dents of New York. It was understood, according to defendant, that
plaintiff would not deal with anyone else until all negotiations had
proved fruitless. Defendant sued plaintiff in England, claiming he
was damaged when plaintiff violated this agreement by his negotia-
tions with another. Plaintiff now seeks to enjoin defendant from
suing him in England, claiming that since the contract was made in
New York, and since all their important witnesses are residents of
New York, an action on that contract in England would prove inequi-
table, vexatious, and oppressive. The Supreme Court of New York
granted plaintiff's motion for an injunction pendente lite. On appeal,
held, reversed. In general, New York courts will not enjoin its
citizens from prosecuting an action against each other in a foreign
jurisdiction in the absence of proof that: (1) the suit in the foreign
jurisdiction was instituted in bad faith or motivated by fraud, or (2)
there was an attempt to evade the law or public policy of New York.
Issuance of equitable relief by injunction in such a case lies within the
sole discretion of the court. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Ben Blu-
menthal, 256 App. Div. 756, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 768 (1st Dept. 1939),
aff'd, 281 N. Y. 106, - N. E. - (1939).
Although it is well settled that a court of equity can enjoin one
within its jurisdiction from suing in another state or country, the
question is, when and under what circumstances it will do so. An
early leading English decision 1 held that an injunction should not
20 Instant case at 943. The court refers to the other subdivisions of N. Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 899 which in substance, "is aimed at a course of behavior
disadvantageous to society, the violation of which makes one a disorderly person,
the abandonment or threat to abandon wife or child; the keeping of bawdy
houses or houses for the resort of prostitutes, gamesters or habitual criminals;
performances by mountebanks; the keeping upon the public highway of an
apparatus for gaming etc."
21 Instant case at 943.
1 Love v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 67, 22 Eng. Rep. 698 (1665).
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